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1. Introduction
When studying processes of public policy and regulation in newly evolv­
ing policy fields in the 1980s, one frequently comes across the superposi­
tion of several paradoxical features. First, the obvious need of a new pol­
icy realm to develop some genuine coherent structure and some regula­
tion at all, if intentional policy and not only politics is aspired to, is con­
fronted with a general socio-political climate favouring deregulation. 
Second, the complexity of new policy fields, which is due to increased 
(scientific) knowledge and reflexion and to their necessary linkage with 
and embedding in already established policy areas leading to an over­
abundance of information and pro and con valuations, seems to require 
elaborated and precise regulations, whereas past experiences tend to indi­
cate counter-productive results of a multitude of detailed regulations. 
Third, the subtle general loss of legitimacy of formal institutionalized 
politics and policies as the natural mode of socially dealing with problems 
of modem industrialized society implies a growing suspicion of the ca­
pability, in principle, of the political system to cope with social problems 
and the erosion of the trust in public policy and regulation. This process, 
however, is confronted with a growing need of formal (political) treat­
ment and regulation of social problems because traditionally (better) 
functioning modes of social self-regulation, i.e. the regulation of affairs 




























































































and values suffer from a similar process of delegitimization as social ar­
rangements and procedures to deal with social development and interac­
tions can no longer be taken for granted any longer (see e.g. the increas­
ing break-down of the reliability of norms of social interaction in 
metropolitan cities).
Environmental policy has developed as a cross-sectional policy during 
the 1970s in western industrialized countries and met many obstacles to 
becoming effective and efficient. Environmental policy in agriculture just 
started to evolve as a policy field of its own during recent years. So, it 
may be considered an ideal field to study the societal processes which de­
termine if and how public policy in general, and regulation in particular, 
still matter in newly developing areas. This question certainly refers to 
the deregulation debate, but is conceived more broadly. It addresses not 
only the question of public regulation of agricultural activities in order to 
prevent corresponding environmental pollution but also the one of the 
value and viability of public policy in general by asking for possible 
(empirically identifiable) functional equivalents for it.
In order to approach this objective the paper proceeds as follows. 
First, a historical perspective on public policy and regulation is provided 
to allow for an appropriate understanding of its development. Second, 
reference is made to other frequently discussed areas subject to deregula­
tion more recently. Against this historical-empirical background the fol­
lowing three sections deal with the theoretical conceptualisation and the 
analytical framework for understanding the social role and significance of 
public policy and regulation by referring to some selected literature on 
the role of public policy and deregulation. Then, the examplary case of 
environmental protection in agriculture is described. Section 7 gives an 
overview of the socio-political way of thematizing and treating the issue 
"agriculture and environment", and the following two sections address 
two specific cases more precisely, namely nitrate pollution and nature 
conservation. Afterwards, the national similarities and differences of 
public policy and regulation are pointed out for these two cases. With this 
empirical knowledge in mind, the analytical framework developed is ap­
plied to the social treatment of environmental problems of agriculture 
with the result that different modes of regulation, deregulation, and re­
regulation appear feasible and that functional equivalents of public policy 
and regulation can be conceived of. After referring this analysis to the 
deregulation debate, some general conclusions are drawn concerning the 
question, posed in the title of the paper, ending in the more fundamental 
question concerning which empirical statements of general interest about 





























































































Historically, the development of a functionally separate political system 
which has the capability, the social legitimacy, and the functional primacy 
to arrive at socially binding decisions and to regulate a growing number 
of spheres of social relations is a new and fragile phenomenon (Luhmann 
1980). Formerly, major parts of social relations were organised and 
regulated by generally valid social norms and values, and primarly due to 
other social institutions. For instance, the (catholic) church had 
considerable power and the socially accepted legitimation to set norms for 
the mode of social interaction to a considerable degree. Another example 
points out the significance of industrial self-regulation already one/two 
centuries ago: it were the self-organised associations like the association 
of German engineers (VDI) which largely decided about and controlled 
the safety and quality standards of industrial production and products 
(Bolenz 1987). So, there is nothing basically new in the recent call for 
public deregulation and increased (industrial) self-regulation. The ideal of 
the "Nachtwachterstaat", the non-intervening state which only provides 
the appropriate regulative boundary conditions for a market-regulated 
capitalist society is well known to the reader and is constantly present in 
the continuing "ordnungspolitischen" debates around preferable 
socioeconomic institutional frameworks (Smith 1937, Eucken 1989).
What has changed in this century is the more broad public recognition 
of the necessity and legitimacy of at least some public regulation of most 
spheres of social and industrial life in order to cope as a society with the 
negative externalities and side-effects of modem capitalist societies in a 
socially acceptable and reasonable manner. The paradigms of the welfare 
state, of Keynesianism, and of public planning confirm this trend as they 
substantially determined public policy in many countries to a considerable 
degree. Second, with the growing knowledge about and mutual 
interpenetration of different spheres of social life the perceived capability 
and necessity to "rationally" regulate them in accordance with the public 
interest ("Gemeinwohl") became more and more pervasive, as the 
examples of nuclear energy, environmental protection, or research 
planning indicate. However, parallel to these developments, the awareness 
of the limitations of such an approach grew, too. The old scepticism 
against overall socialist planning and the failure of socialist economies, 
recently, the disenchantment with technical progress, the limited access to 
and lacking management capability of processing information for the state 
(cf. Keck 1984, 1987), and the essential inability of modem societies to 
deal with their self-generated risks (Perrow 1984, Beck 1986, 1988), all 
point to the genuine limits to any public policy and regulation. However, 
as elaborated in the corresponding academic literature, this recognition 
results in pleading more for better, more flexible arrangements of public 
regulation, and re-regualtion and less for simple deregulation 



























































































The deregulation debate mostly referred to other areas than 
environmental policy, namely air traffic control, airline deregulation, 
financial markets, broadcasting etc. The deregulation of these areas 
frequently refers to genuine economic concerns such as competition, or 
failures in markets for information, or uneconomic bureaucratic 
overregulation. Here, the recognition of and/or the belief in the 
superiority of market (self-) regulation and the (obvious) disadvantages of 
intense public regulation is partly hard to dispute. Although under 
differing ideological angles, there exists considerable consensus 
meanwhile that at least partial self-regulation by those concerned with and 
knowledgable about the field of regulation is preferable over (detailed) 
regulation by (more distant) public authorities, even if one may advocate 
parallel regulation as a solution to some regulatory problem fields 
(Kay/Vickers 1990). But already in the aftermath of the West German 
debate about the theory of the state (see e.g. Grottian/Murswieck 1974, 
Habermas 1973, Henning et al. 1974, Offe 1972, Ronge/Schmieg 1973) 
pointing at the structural preconditions and restrictions of public policy 
and regulation some left-oriented authors addressed the question of 
societal self-regulation by capital and labour aside from the state and gave 
a considerable role to this nongovernmental regulation of industrial 
relations (see e.g. Ronge 1979, 1980, Jurgens 1980, Conrad 1981). In the 
meantime, the analysis of quangos (quasi-nongovemmental organisations) 
has developed into a political science specialty of its own. So, based on a 
good deal of empirical evidence there is considerable agreement and 
recognition of the limitations of public regulation and on the existence of 
non-public functional equivalents for public policy from very diverse 
political stances. This is, however, not to say that the actual modes of 
deregulation chosen and developed in practice have already more or less 
proven to be superior or even viable ways of organising the 
corresponding spheres of social and economic life. A more differentiated 
case-specific look is then required to come to empirically valid 
conclusions about the preferability of different modes of regulating social 
and economic relations.
In sum, the main conclusions which may be drawn from the current 
debate on deregulation are the following (cf. Hancher/Moran 1989, 
Majone 1990): 1
1. What is actually to be observed is the parallel occurrence of 
deregulation and re-regulation.




























































































2. The political appeal of deregulation has to do with the growing 
recognition of trends of ineffectiveness, of overburdening, of 
overregulation in recent modes of public policy and regulation.1
3. If there is a divergence of objectives between principal and agent, this 
divergence will remain whatever (public or private) structures or 
mechanisms of regulation are put in place." (Kay/Vickers 1990:232)
4. The recognition and political acceptance of functionally equivalent 
modes of public, private or quango-type regulation have been increasing.
5. The modes of arranging (and regulating) social affairs have become 
more varied. So, the question rarely is: public regulation, yes or no, but 
to find a mixture to be preferable for economic, political or social 
reasons.
6. Intentional attempts by public policy to re-regulate policy domains 
more efficiently and more effectively by greater reliance on cooperation 
and self-regulation of the policy addressees can well be observed aside 
from ideological deregulation campaigns.
7. The political struggles underlying the deregulation debate only partly 
refer to the substantive claims made by its proponents. They reflect, to a 
considerable degree, political fights of power, influence and interest 
consideration, too.
4. The significance of theoretical conceptualisation
As is well known, the way of looking at something and the categories used 
to describe something significantly influence the analytical conclusions to 
be drawn. If we study the problems of government and of public policy 
and regulation in terms of marxist class theory, functional systems theory, 
or formal decision and game theory matters crucially. Whereas the first 
perspective may point out the structural restrictions and limitations of any 
state regulation (Hirsch 1974), the second may emphasize the autopoietic 
self-reproduction of the political system by treating any external stimulus 
in the code of politics and thus keeping its functional autonomy (Luhmann 
1986), and the third may stress the relevance of mixed motive games for 
regulatory activities of any government in modern societies (Scharpf 
1988). Since none of these perspectives on public regulation can be 
considered as uniquely necessary, I took no exclusive decision on the 
theoretical conceptualisation of the problem of public policy and 1
1 For example, the conclusions of the Dutch Deregulation Action Programme from 
1983 regarding permits in environmental regulation were: "the reduction and 
simplification of legal rules with regard to business; the reduction of the number of 
permits; and the streamlining of procedures to a level consistent with what was 
considered to be socially absolutely necessary. The guiding consideration in all this was 
that building, expanding and operating of industrial firms should not be made unduly 




























































































regulation and draw on few theoretical approaches judged to provide 
appropriate insight.
This may be justified by the main objective of the paper, namely to 
find out in how far public policy and regulation matter for a substantive 
purpose, i.e. environmental protection in agriculture, and this on four 
levels: do they matter factually (an empirical question), do they matter in 
the forseeable future (a prognostic question), are they necessary 
prerequisites under present socioeconomic conditions (a theoretical 
question), and what may be their (necessary) functional role aside from 
substantial environmental protection in agriculture (an analytical 
question)? The chosen perspective of analysis matters as much as the 
theoretical approach. Whether public regulation matters or not depends 
on the interest underlying the investigation. For what does public 
regulation matter? Is the interest in economic efficiency, in the substance 
of regulation, in optimal organisation, in detailed planning and control, in 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of legal regulation against 
indirect regulation by market mechanisms, or in strengthening the power 
and influence of certain social groups and actors? Whereas I look at the 
role of public policy and regulation as a medium and instrument for such 
possible purposes on the fourth level of analysis indicated above, my main 
interest clearly is on the substantive side: do they promote and are they 
necessarily needed for environmental protection in agriculture? The 
answer to this question is important for policy conclusions concerning the 
further development of agro-environmental policy.
A closer look shows that the paper addresses two analytically distinct 
questions: does public regulation matter as opposed to private regulation; 
and does regulation matter as opposed to other modes of social 
organisation of environmental protection in agriculture? It is one 
question, how much regulation we need for this substantive purpose, 
considered here in more general and less case specific terms, and another 
question, in how far this regulation should be arranged as a public one.
5. Analytical distinctions
After having made clear the substantive and general orientation of the 
paper several helpful distinctions are pointed out relevant for developing 
the analytical framework to study the title question of the paper.
These distinctions mainly refer to the issue of regulation versus 
deregulation, and hardly to the one of public versus private regulation. If 
not stated otherwise, however, the issue of deregulation is largely 
identified with public regulation, and its partial substitution by private 
self-regulation, in accordance with current literature.
Before pinpointing various useful analytical distinctions, it appears 





























































































"The concept of regulation, it has often been noted, is one which 
eludes precise definition. 'Deregulation' is an even more elusive idea. The 
problem lies in part in the analytical complexity of the term: like 
regulation, it can apply to a precise range of policy instruments or legal 
rules, and it can also be connected to a wider and more diffuse process of 
system maintenance or disturbance. But analytical complexity is 
compounded by another consideration. 'Deregulation' was one of the 
slogans of the 1980s, and privatisation and deregulation will probably 
remain high on policy agendas well into the next decade. Deregulation is 
thus not .merely an anlytical concept. It is also an ideological construct, 
whose purpose is to allow policy makers the opportunity of legitimising a 
wide range of activities, many of which do not necessarily correspond to 
'deregulation' in its most obvious everyday meaning - the relaxation or 
abolition of constraining rules." (Hancher/Moran 1989:129) In addition, 
"as every student of the subject knows, in America regulation is a distinct 
type of policy-making that has spawned a distinct theoretical and 
empirical literature; indeed, in economics and political science the study 
of regulation has been elevated to the status of a subdiscipline (Noll 
1985). The situation is different in Europe. Here, despite the intensity of 
the current debate about deregulation at the national and Community 
levels, research on the economics and politics of public regulation is still a 
relatively new area of scholarship." (Majone 1990a:l) The term 
regulation is often used differently on the two sides of the Atlantic. "In 
Europe there is a tendency to identify regulation with the whole realm of 
legislation, governance and social control...By contrast, within the 
framework of American public policy and administration, regulation has 
acquired a more specific meaning. It refers to sustained and focused 
control exercised by a public agency over activities that are generally 
regarded as desirable to society (Selznick 1985:363)...(This) implies that 
regulation is not achieved simply by passing a law, but requires detailed 
knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the regulated activity...It 
follows that regulatory policy-making requires, not bureaucratic 
generalists, but specialized agencies or commissions capable of fact­
finding, rule-making, and enforcement. In turn, these differences in 
meaning reflect significant ideological and institutional diffemeces 
between the American and European approach to the political control of 
market processes....(In Europe), even when regulatory instruments like 
price controls, standard setting or licensing have been used, there has 
been a general reluctance to rely on specialized, single-purpose 
agencies...The absence of independent regulatory bodies, the confusion of 
operation and regulation, the preponderance of informal procedures for 
rule-making, and the diffuseness of various corporatist arrangements of 
self-regulation, are all factors that explain the low visibility of regulatory 
policy-making in Europe, and the consequent lack of sustained scholarly 
attention...In Europe, as in the United States, traditional structures of 




























































































ideological, technological and economic forces, and are being dismantled 
or radically transformed. This is often called 'deregulation', but...that is a 
misleading term...(Often) the important issue is not deregulation but 
rather...how to achieve the relevant regulatory objectives by less 
burdensome methods of governmental intervention. In sum, what is 
observed in practice is never total deregulation, but a combination of 
deregulation and reregulation.” (Majone 1990a:l-3)2
These citations already indicate the necessity to differentiate various 
dimensions of public regulation and deregulation.
1. "There are two basic means by which a regulator can influence the 
behaviour of an industry with whose performances he is concerned. She 
can regulate the structure of the industry of she/he can regulate its 
behaviour...Examples of stmctural regulation include: restrictions on 
entry; statutory monopoly; single capacity rules; rules against individuals 
supplying professional services without recognized qualifications. 
Examples of conduct regulation include: measures to guard against anti­
competitive behaviour by dominant incumbent firms; price control; mles 
against advertising and other restrictions on competitive activity...The 
recent combinations of deregulation with reregulation are less paradoxical 
if it is remembered that there are these two broad types of regulation. 
What has happened in several industries recently is a shift of emphasis 
between structure and conduct regulation (as in financial services), or a 
policy choice between the two (as with the issue of vertical separation in 
network industries). The choice is not much about whether to regulate, 
but about which mode of regulation to adopt...The weakness of conduct 
regulation is that to be effective it must be concerned with aspects of 
service provision that are readily measured; and these may be only 
loosely related to the issues of underlying concern." (Kay/Vickers 
1990:233-4)
2. "If deregulation is the mirror image of regulation it should thus mean 
either: (i) the explicit alteration, amendment or abolition of a set of rules; 
or (ii) the breakdown of the mechanisms which hold a system at or 
around a point of equilibrium" (Hancher/Moran 1989:130), i.e. a 
distinction between (deliberate) changes in the structure and content of 
rules, and systemic dislocation.3,4
2 "In this process deregulation is a kind of regulatory reform, the goal being to make 
regulation more efficient." (Hancher/Moran 1989:131)
3 e.g. the declining capacity of the airline cartels to specify and to police a stable 
system of pricing and market sharing in the international market for passenger transport 
(Cemy 1989).
4 "The distinction between the two forms of deregulation may be characterised as a 
distinction between the active and the passive. Policy makers change rules and the 
instruments of implementation. But systems also 'get deregulated' - by technological 
invention, historical crises or economic innovation. As they get deregulated, so existing 




























































































3. "Three different kinds of rule change are in practice important: 
cancellation, substitution and systematisation." (Hancher/Moran 1989:130) 
This differentiation clearly indicates the possible overlap of deregulation 
(cancellation) and reregulation (substitution or systematisation).
4. A further distinction refers to rule setting versus rule enforcement. 
"Much that passes for 'deregulation' is not so much a change in the 
content of rules, or a departure from regulatory objectives, as an 
adjustment to the means of enforcement. The state's retreat from a 
regulatory arena in such instances characteristically involves a shift from 
implementation by command to implementation via market mechanisms 
or through negotiation and bargaining." (Hancher/Moran 1989:131)
5. Then, it is important to distinguish different policy levels of 
regulation whith varying scope of their regulatory objectives. Here, the 
problem of overregulation comes in. What still appears a feasible 
regulatory approach on the level of regional government, may well be 
unfeasible on the level of the European Commission. Thus, the 
Commission itself concluded: "Experience has shown that the alternative 
of relying on a strategy based totally on harmonization would be over- 
regulatory, would take a long time to implement, would be inflexible and 
could stifle innovation." (EC-Commission 1985:18) "The new approach 
has three key elements: regulation at Community level is to be replaced, 
whenever possible, by mutual recognition of national regulations and 
standards; harmonization is to be confined to laying down 'essential health 
and safety reqauirements' which will be binding on all Member States; 
technical specification of these requirements is to be left to European and 
national standardization organizations." (Majone 1990a:4) However, there 
are limits of the new approach, and difficulties of implementing it. These 
make the push by the EC-Commission for centralized single-purpose 
regulatory agencies, similar to US ones, more probable.5
6. "It is a truism that deregulation, like regulation, has a location - a 
location in space, a location in time and a location in particular economic 
and political settings." (Hancher/Moran 1989:132) Distinctive national 
cultural configurations and differing patterns of interest and power 
according to the respective policy arenas clearly strongly influence the 
case-specific regulatory setting and deregulation process as situational 
variables. Consequently, public regulation can be expected to vary from 
country to country, from area to area, and over time. These variations 
should allow to draw theoretical conclusions about possible functional 
equivalents of public regulation, when abstracting from case-specific 
historical configurations.
5 "Hence, regardless of the initial institutional arrangements, something looking very 
much like a regulatory agency or commission, capable of detailed assessment and rule- 





























































































7. Furthermore, the range and scope of a regulatory framework has to 
be taken into consideration. As far as "the political legitimacy or 
economic effectiveness of the 'govemors'in a wide range of policy areas 
have been weakened" (Hancher/Moran 1989:136) in general, there are 
unresolved problems of public regulation at the general macro-level 
caused by turbulances and overcomplexities of more recent societal 
development processes and by the gradual disintegration of the prevailing 
international order. At the meso-level, regulation and deregulation of 
particular areas or industries in view of technological innovation, changes 
in market practices, and changing public attitudes have to be 
reconsidered. And "at the micro-level, changing techniques of monitoring 
and enforcement offer new possibilities for 'light-touch' implementation 
of regulatory programmes." (Hancher/Moran 1989:136)
8. If one reviews "the institutions of regulation in a descending 
hierarchy of state involvement, beginning with nationalization and ending 
with the internal regulation undertaken by firms themselves" 
(Kay/Vickers 1990:230), it is well known by now that nationalization does 
not remove the principal/agent problem6: it merely puts it within the 
context of a particular institutional structure. Thus, again the need to 
distinguish between the problem of regulation and the one of public or 
private organisation of regulation is emphasized, as the examples of 
regulatory inefficiency and regulatory capture signify.
9. As rising complexity and interdependence of causal relations at the 
level of societal systems result in a growing density of interorganizational 
networks which makes the sovereignty and identity of participating 
organizations appear precarious and which is by the way indicated by the 
observable exchangeability ob public and private institutions for the 
accomplishment of public functions (Streeck 1987), and as public policy 
has lost its - never unproblematic - capability to neglect distributional 
conflicts alongside with the growing degree government has given up its 
prerogative of unilateral hierarchical decision-making and is only able to 
exercise political control in a texture of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements (Scharpf 1988:79), both, the necessity of public regulation 
and the feasibility of public regulation become precarious and doubtful.7 
At the same time, modem societies have a never ending supply of 'public 
tasks', and thus a need for public regulation because of their own grown 
externalities due to public and private action. In this context, "it is a 
striking feature of regulatory history that industries are generally
6 "A principal/agent problem generally takes the following form. A (the principal) has 
objectives which can only be eachieved by B (the agent), because B has immediate 
responsibility for the decisions, or better information, or commonly both." (Kay/Vickers 
1990:230)
7 The discrepancy between formal responsibilities and competences and actual reality 
of social and political life and decision-making in Italy may serve as an illustrative 




























































































opposed both to the introduction of new regulation and to the dismantling 
of old regulation. Industries dislike the prospect of regulation but 
frequently find comfortable ways of living with it in practice." 
(Kay/Vickers 1990:232) As a consequence of these features, the evolution 
of public regulation is strongly determined by the perceived need of an 
improved management of growing uncertainties via procedures of meta­
regulation, via policy integration relying to more conscious interest 
coupling, e.g. that effective environmental policy must build on the 
motivations and world of experience of those whose behaviour is to be 
regulated. Similar to the partial substitution of management by 
hierarchical control to management by delegation the practical realization 
in the deregulation debate is important that successful (environmental) 
policy is ultimately dependent on the active commitment of the target 
firms themselves to the objectives sought. (Hanf 1989)
6. Analytical framework
After this sketch of various analytical distinctions relevant for this paper 
this section outlines the corresponding framework utilized below for the 
empirical analysis with the following main categories of analysis.
1. In the historical-empirical dimension, I am interested in the historical 
evolution of environmental regulation in agriculture
- in general and along two specific examples,
- in the four countries analysed, namely D, F, NL and UK,
- with respect to the prevailing pattern of culture, policy style, power and 
interest relations,
- with respect to the politico-administrative level of regulation (EC, 
national, regional, local),
- and concerning the similarities and differences across countries and 
examplary cases.
2. Referring to the above analytical distinctions, I will distinguish 
between
- public, private and mixed regulatory activities,
- regulation versus non- and deregulation,
- structure versus conduct regulation,
- changes in regulatory rules versus systemic dislocation,
- mle-making versus rule-enforcement,
- development of a general policy and regulatory framework versus ad- 
hoc policy-making and regulation.
3. The more theoretically oriented conclusions aspiring to generalization 
will attempt
- to give reasons for the varying processes of evolving environmental 
regulation in agriculture,
- to give due account to the different patterns of politics and regulation in 




























































































- to distinguish between past empirical, probable future and unequivocal 
theoretical conclusions concerning the significance of public policy and 
regulation for environmental protection in agriculture,
- to elaborate on the "objective" need and evaluative criteria to publicly 
regulate environmental protection in agriculture,
- to point out viable functional equivalents for the substantive purpose of 
environmental protection in agriculture,
- (and perhaps to "speculate" on the structural interrelations of the 
various determinants of agro-environmental policy and regulation.)
The subsequent sections provide the corresponding evaluative judgements; 
however, for further details and justification the reader is referred to the 
corresponding literature (see e.g Conrad 1990, 1991).
7. The historical evolution of 'agriculture and environment' as 
a socio-political issue
Whereas the subsequent specific case studies are able to delineate the 
evolution of regulation in practice, tracing the development of the issue of 
agriculture and environment provides the more general context of public 
regulation in this field.
Environmental problems of agriculture have become a political issue 
from about the late 1970s onward. Only since the 1980s policy programs 
were developed and attempts of public regulation could be observed to 
protect the environment against agricultural pollution and destruction, 
partly due to the ongoing processes of intensification, specialisation, 
mechanisation, rationalisation, internal expansion, growing capital 
intensity, regional concentration of agricultural production spheres, and 
shifting of steps of food production into input and food processing 
industries (see von Meyer 1983, de Haen 1985, SRU 1985). With respect 
to both the processes of 'economicalisation' of agriculture and agro- 
environmental policy efforts, differences exist between England, France, 
West Germany and the Netherlands, with the Netherlands probably most 
advanced in agro-industrialisation and in agro-environmental regulation. 
This does not imply, however, a simple correlation between growing 
environmental threats of modem agriculture, on the one hand, and 
enhanced environmental protection in agriculture, on the other hand. 
What can be observed in all countries is the gradual, sequential (often 
issue-specific) process of public debate and controversy, symbolic policy 
programs, regulatory mle-making with little enforcement, weakened 
resistance by agricultural interests alongside the crisis of agricultural 
policy, and more substantial regulatory efforts in combination with the 
emphasis on self-regulation.
In order to reasonably understand the evolution of regulation for 
environmental protection in agriculture, three crucial socio-political 




























































































1. The agricultural sector is one with intense public regulation 
(administered prices, Common Agricultural Policy, market organisations, 
huge subsidies for agricultural production and goods).
2. Agricultural production by farmers has been perceived at the same 
time, however, as free entrepreneurship not subject to any public 
regulation. (Market forces still play a crucial role within regulated 
agricultural markets.)
3. Whereas agricultural policy largely followed corresponding 
agricultural interests, the influence of environmental policy on changing 
agricultural production according to environmental norms has been 
marginal. The unequal power distribution between environmental and 
agricultural interests and the structural weakness of environmental policy 
(Conrad 1988) prevented significant impacts of environmental regulatory 
efforts in the past.
As a consequence, one observes that public regulation of agriculture 
is well established and works on the level of agro-economic policy, and is 
not well established and does not work on the level of agro-environmental 
policy. This is a clear example how the configuration of politico- 
economic interests strongly influenced the feasibility and viability of 
public regulation.
Interestingly, public regulation of agricultural markets mainly occurs 
on the EC-level, though supplemented but also substantively "replaced" by 
national and regional agricultural regulation.
Since hardly any environmental regulation of agriculture existed, the 
debate has not been on deregulation in agro-environmental policy, but on 
the reliability of moral suasion of and self-regulation by farmers as 
opposed to public regulation, and on deregulation in agricultural policy, 
especially advanced by agricultural economists. The agricultural lobby 
clearly resisted environmentally oriented regulation of agricultural 
production, whereas the environmental lobby tended to support it. To the 
extent that environmental regulation of agriculture was finally accepted as 
necessary because of the systemic dislocation, i.e. increasingly 
unacceptable environmental hazards of agriculural production, the 
political fights often concerned the sufficiency of amendments of existing 
(agricultural policy) rules instead of installing new more systematic agro- 
environmental regulations.
As far as public regulation as opposed to private self-regulation was 
considered and realised, it was essentially conduct, and little structural 
regulation. Since one could not yet speak of an agro-environmental policy 
in the 1980s, issue-specific ad-hoc regulations pervaded without an 
overall regulatory framework. Politically the question of rule-making 
versus enforcement was of secondary importance only because the crucial 
issue was the admissibility of agro-environmental regulation in general, 
although this question has generally gained considerable recognition in 




























































































For the future, some deregulation in agricultural policy and some 
enhanced environmental regulation of agriculture in combination with 
economic incentives and self-regulation by farmers and advisory services 
can be expected. This does not yet allow any stringent theoretical 
conclusions on the available space for functional equivalents and on the 
"objective" need and criteria for public regulation in favour of 
environmental protection in agriculture. However, there are not only the 
argument of empirical development trends but also plausible theoretical 
reasons for the need of some public agro-environmental policy because 
without it the substantive goal of at least limiting environmental pollution 
of agriculture will be hard to be achieved at all.
8. Specific cases: nitrate pollution
Since the detection of the correlation of high nitrate contents of drinking 
water and the occurrence of methemoglobinemia (Comley 1945) the 
health risks of nitrate contaminated drinking water were in the center of 
the academic and political debates about the environmental problems of 
nitrate, which form only a part of many ecological problems connected 
with the total nitrogen cycle. Whereas the problem of nitrate pollution 
was dealt with politically on the water side by setting the appropriate 
nitrate drinking water standard, which was lowered effectively by the EC 
drinking water directive from 1980 to 50 mg/1, there was considerable 
debate till the early 1980s about the causal role of agriculture, mainly 
high doses of mineral nitrogen fertilizer and large amounts of animal 
manure, and the undertaking of corresponding preventive measures to 
avoid the problem of nitrate pollution of ground and drinking water. On 
the agricultural side, the main emphasis was on information campaigns 
and appropriate advisory services to reduce nitrate wash-out in 
agriculture, and only recently restrictions on the amount and time of 
spreading (liquid) animal manure were imposed by public regulation in 
some West German states, and a system of charges has been introduced in 
the Netherlands in 1987 whereby farmers must pay an amount based on 
the quality of wastes produced above a given quantity according on its 
phosphate content. Only in water protection zones or in nitrate sensitive 
areas in England more serious restrictions of agricultural practices are 
feasible in principle and have been imposed since recent years. In France, 
general regulatory schemes are available, in principle, to seriously 
restrict farming practices according to environmental objectives, but they 
have hardly been applied in the past. Only some requirements of building 
animal manure storage tanks have been imposed on animal farmers in the 
Bretagne. In all countries, enforcement control of these quite recent 
regulatory measures is still weak, except perhaps for the time restrictions 
of spreading liquid animal manure. Public subsidies for building animal 




























































































regulation of animal manure spreading. The concept of an 
(environmental) tax on mineral fertilizers has been discussed during the 
1980s at many places, but was realised only on a low level in Austria, 
Finland and Sweden. Concerning excess nitrate concentrations in drinking 
water, temporary exceptions from the official nitrae standard were 
frequently admitted.
Altogether, one observes the following features of public policy and 
regulation in the case of nitrate pollution. The nitrate problem is 
conceived and dealt with largely as a specific problem. Conduct 
regulation referred only to the water side in the past, but also to parts of 
agricultural production more recently. However, the main emphasis on 
the side of agriculture still essentially is on voluntary self-regulation by 
the farmers themselves with the partial exception of water protection 
zones. Enforcement of existing regulations can be assumed in most cases 
for the drinking water standard, but much less so for regulations 
concerning agriculture, although gradual improvements can be observed 
here, too. However, the improvements may be due more to the changing 
socio-cultural climate in favour of environmental protection imposing 
social pressure on farmers than to existing explicit regulations. Whereas 
some "objective" need to regulate nitrate pollution may be derived from 
its various ecological impacts, this is hardly possible by the specific health 
risks of nitrate concentrations in drinking water just somewhat above 50 
mg/1.
When one includes private agreements between water utilities and 
local farmers concerning agricultural practices and compensation 
payments in areas of water extraction, we find public as well as mixed 
and private regulatory schemes. Clearly, in the case of nitrate pollution, 
the question is one of regulation or non-regulation, and not one of 
deregulation. Partly, the new regulations imposed are based on the 
extension of existing regulations, as the example of liquid animal manure 
orders in West Germany shows, which are based on the federal waste 
disposal act.
The probable further increase of nitrate concentrations in drinking 
water in quite a few, though not in every, areas will tend to enlarge the 
political pressure for and the enforceability of public regulation of nitrate 
pollution. Whereas for drinking water standards it is hard to see what 
kind of non-public functional equivalents would be practically feasible, 
this question has to be judged differently for the side of agriculture. Here, 
as the British example seems to indicate, the socio-cultural pressure on 
farmers to sign voluntary agreements which provide some not very 
attractive compensation payments for the acceptance of restrictions on 
their agricultural practices may well lead to similar effects of reduced 
nitrate wash-out as mandatory regulation in nitrate sensitive areas. So, 
there are both general reasons for the growing tendency towards publicly 
regulating nitrate pollution and national and situational reasons for 




























































































9. Specific cases: nature conservation
Activities towards nature conservation have a long tradition in European 
countries stemming from about hundred years ago. In the past, the farmer 
was frequently considered to be a nature conservationist per se opposing 
the destruction of traditional agricultural landscapes by industrial and 
urban expansion. Only recently, alongside the dissemination of modem 
"industrial" agriculture, agriculture was increasingly accused to be a 
major reason for the loss of natural biotopes and species (see Shoard 
1980). Two options became a matter of debate in England, West Germany 
and the Netherlands in the 1980s: the possible combination of nature 
conservation and an environmentally compatible agriculture, and the 
installation of separate nature protection zones by taking land out of 
conventional agricultural production and allowing at best marginal 
agricultural land use (see cf. Hampicke 1987). Whereas for the first 
option public regulation was neither existent nor considered worthwhile 
in the past, some general legal provisions concerning nature protection 
zones were available in the past in all four countries and quite a few 
natural parks and nature protection zones have been established during the 
last decades, however, with few substantial restrictions on agricultural 
practices. Recently, some policy programs providing subsidies and advice 
for modes of agricultural production in line with specific environmental 
objectives (e.g. environmentally sensitive areas according to article 19 of 
the EC structural regulation 797/85) have been advanced on the regional, 
national and EC level, and more rigorous prescriptions are foreseen for 
newly envisaged nature protection zones. Nature conservation has been an 
issue of public debate to some degree in England, West Germany and the 
Netherlands, but hardly in France. Again, one can observe that existing 
regulation does only matter at all if a corresponding public opinion and a 
favourable political climate exist.
Apart from a general regulatory framework allowing to pursue in 
principle a nature protection policy, a lot of actual nature conservation 
activities have been developed primarily by private organisations, which 
often were the driving force behind the social promotion of nature 
conservation objectives. Thus, although a certain legal framework for 
public structural and conduct regulation of nature conservation can be 
identified in all four countries it has hardly played any substantial role in 
the past, except to certify informally established agreements around 
nature conservation projects. In this case, it is even doubtful to only speak 
of lacking implementation of existing regulation which was hardly 
perceived as intended for the purpose of restricting agriculture for nature 
protection objectives by decision-makers, as the statements in articles 1 
and 8 of the (still effective) Nature Protection Act of West Germany of 
1976 exemplify, where ordinary agriculture is considered as serving the 
goals of nature protection by law. So, in contrast to the case of nitrate 




























































































on the level of symbolic policy in the past, and only recently a changing 
socio-political climate appears to facilitate and to result in some more 
substantial regulation of nature conservation. But even assuming this 
process of development, the problem of enforcement and ecological 
effectiveness will tend to last despite more clear-cut regulation on nature 
conservation. Behind an image of some public regulation, non-regulation 
and non-enforcement still dominate in practice.
For nature conservation, some growth of regulation and endeavours 
towards an overall regulatory framework with attempts to reconcile agri­
cultural and environmental interests, as the Dutch example shows, can be 
expected. Altogether, the pattern of the social treatment of nature conser­
vation will be and also will be perceived as a (necessary) mixture of pub­
lic and private regulation and self-organisation so that the question of 
feasible functional equivalents can reasonably relate only to specific pol­
icy arrangements, provisions and instruments, and not to the social organ­
isation of nature conservation in general. A whole set of contextual and 
situational factors influenced the past development of nature conservation 
arrangements, and no consistent and persistent nature conservation policy 
was followed on the substantive level apart from recent developments in 
the Netherlands. Without further specification of the substantive meaning 
of nature conservation no stringent theoretical conclusions about public 
policy and regulation of nature conservation may be deemed feasible.
10. Comparing public policy and regulation between countries
When comparing the four countries with respect to their environmental 
policy in agriculture in general, one can state on a rather abstract level 
that the basic problems are the same, that similar principles to deal with 
these problems tend to evolve, and that below this level few non-specific 
qualifications are appropriate. In substance, this means that because mod­
em agriculture is increasingly becoming reality the countries experience 
basically the same threats to the environment, and that the imposition of 
corresponding environmental restrictions on agriculture is first of all 
tried on the basis of moral suasion and then of compensation payments.
Environmental problems of agriculture became an issue of public and 
political debate during the 1970s in the Netherlands, since the late 1970s 
in West Germany via pollution and food residues due to agrochemicals, 
and in England via loss of the countryside. In France, agricultural emis­
sions into surface and ground waters were increasingly recognized during 
the 1980s, but a public agriculture-environment debate was still largely 
non-existent until 1990. Substantive problem solutions are still feasible in 
most cases, but they were only taken into political consideration in rare 
cases and reluctantly. The steps undertaken to limit the problem of nitrate 
pollution in West Germany and the Netherlands, and the designation of 




























































































lands are the more or less only non-unique examples of substantive 
(regulatory) attempts to protect the environment against agricultural de­
struction in the 1980s.
In substance, the policy pattern in the field of agriculture and the en­
vironment gradually and continuously changed towards serious perception 
instead of denial of the problem, towards more mandatory regulation, and 
towards compensation payments. Formally, concerning the dominant 
policy style, the national policy patterns have remained more stable; only 
the increasing role of politics and regulation on the EC level indicates a 
significant change. Nowhere the core of established agricultural policy 
has yet been touched by environmental policy measures. An agro-envi- 
ronmental policy concept has been formulated at best in the Netherlands.
It remains still an open question if agro-environmental policy will de­
velop into a separate (environmental) policy field or be primarily inte­
grated into existing - agricultural and regional - policies. In the past two 
decades, the picture of environmental policy in agriculture was essentially 
one of nascent political perception, manifold political bargaining resulting 
in some countries in a more or less common policy framework, and ac­
tual non-policy. The urgency of environmental problems of agriculture 
on the one hand and the necessary long-term time horizon of their solu­
tion on the other hand make it difficult to distinguish prudent from alibi 
policy orientations, although the latter ones seem to have dominated in the 
past.
This sketchy overview of the evolution and main features of 
environmental policy in agriculture in the four countries analysed (see 
Conrad 1991) provides the background against which the role and 
significance of public regulation in this field has to be compared among 
the four countries.
In West Germany and the Netherlands with a legalistic tradition of 
policy-making more explicit attempts to introduce rules in order to 
regulate environmental protection in agriculture could be observed than 
in England and France, although in each country the major emphasis was 
on moral suasion and voluntary agreements. Public regulation of 
agricultural production itself - aside from well-known examples of 
private contract farming - was perceived to contradict the image of the 
farmer as a free entrepreneur. In no country special single-purpose 
agencies with appropriate regulatory power were established.8 Whereas 
in England the established tradition of political culture relies more on 
informal self-regulation on the basis of agreed upon general (legal) rules9 
than on mandatory in-depth regulation, in France the necessary general 
legal prescriptions are formally available in most cases but are referred to
8 The cases of the British Nature Conservancy Council or the German land 
consolidation authorities (Flurbereinigungsbehorden) are no substantial counter-examples 
to this qualification.




























































































and utilized only under the conditions of a corresponding policy 
orientation and effective administration. Here, it depends on the 
respective political climate if existing regulation is applied effectively.
The resistance of the agricultural lobby is against both, public  
intervention and regulatory restrictions, in all countries investigated. 
However, the differences in legalistic tradition may well account for the 
greater negligence in England and France towards the national 
implementation of the nitrate standard of the EC drinking water directive. 
In any case, the EC Commission addressed the European Court of Justice 
because of lacking implementation of this directive by Great Britain, 
France and West Germany as well as five other EC member states in 
1989, though for different specific reasons. In all countries, the efforts 
addressing environmental protection in agriculture preferably try to 
generate and embed public regulation within the existing legal and 
regulatory framework. The enforcement of (new) agro-environmental 
regulations has become a matter of political concern only very recently. 
To a varying degree all countries consider informal self-regulation on the 
basis of voluntary agreements and compensation payments as a preferable 
functional equivalent to corresponding public regulation. Only the 
growing recognition of the serious limitations and weaknesses of these 
voluntary approaches towards increasing environmental concern in 
agriculture enhanced the readiness towards at least some public policy and 
regulation in this respect. Although varying in detail and in the 
development in time, the general orientation of all countries towards 
public policy and regulation for environmental protection in agriculture 
appears to develop into a similar direction on the level of concrete action: 
some public regulation is considered necessary and unavoidable, but in 
theory, or at least in practice as a supplement to the voluntary self­
commitment of the farmers to guard their environment. Only in 
environmentally very sensitive areas like water or nature protection zones 
detailed mandatory regulation and control, too, are meanwhile more or 
less judged necessary.1®
11. The analytical framework applied: the social treatment of 
environmental problems of agriculture
In this section, the analytical framework described above is applied more 
schematically to point out the main features of public policy and regula­
tion for environmental problems in agriculture. Table 1 indicates the cor­
responding evaluation. 1
111 I will not judge, however, in how far these locally restricted regulations serve the 





























































































































































































































































































































Table 1 also summarizes the previous assessment of public regulation for 
environmental protection in agriculture. For the past, it cannot be stated 
that public regulation was the favourite way in the countries investigated 
to cope with environmental problems of agriculture despite the fact that 
the agricultural sector is a strongly regulated one. Where public 
regulation gained some ground as in the Netherlands and West Germany, 
the image is still misleading for the past because this regulation mainly 
consisted of legal prescriptions with little administrative enforcement and 
substantive impacts as yet, although this situation may well change in the 
future. Emphasis was laid on persuasive politics, voluntary management 
agreements, and local self-regulation by farmers and agricultural bodies. 
Only concerning human health, some more rigorous regulation via 
standard setting and control prevails, as the example of nitrate pollution 
shows. Whereas one can still speak of only little public regulation, the 
topic 'agriculture and environment' has become an issue for public policy 
already during the last decade. Only for France this qualification is still 
somewhat overstated. For the future a mixed picture of more substantive 
public regulation, reliance on private and quango-type self-regulation, 
and non-regulatory procedures of limiting agricultural pollution of the 
environment can be expected to develop further.
For the two specific cases public regulation is no less but partly more 
developed than in agro-environmental policy in general. Regulatory 
efforts can be identified on all levels of policy-making from the EC level 
down to the communal level with the main focus on the national and state 
level. As far as regulation was established, it was essentially conduct 
regulation. Frequently, the new regulation was based on the extension and 
amendment of already existing agricultural or environmental regulations. 
Functional equivalents to public regulation appear possible and are 
seriously taken into account by agro-environmental policy. Apart from 
the increasingly perceived need for regulation, the criteria for 
introducing regulation differ from country to country, and from region 
to region.
12. Embedding the assessment in the deregulation debate
This embedding should be done on two levels: the one of environmental 
policy and the one of the deregulation debate in general.
On the level of environmental policy, the analysis of Hanf (1989) is 
especially worth-while. He pointed out the following central reflections 
for Dutch environmental policy:
"The expanding scope and increasing complexity of regulations made 
it more and more difficult to react quickly and appropriately to new 
social developments... Where enforcement is uncertain, because its 
effectiveness is questionable, the integrity of the legal system as such tends 




























































































connected with the management of an extensive system of government 
intervention, economic arguments were advanced to support and justify 
deregulation... Deregulation was not to be pursued as an end in itself, but 
rather constituted a critical examination of the ways along which 
established policy goals were to be sought... The government has made 
clear from the start that deregulation was not to be equated with the 
simple abolition of existing rules... In addition to reducing the regulatory 
burdens of firms, such reforms (of the permitting system) were expected 
to free time for the environmental authorities for the more complicated 
and important cases as well as for the enforcement activities which, until 
then, had been relatively neglected... Only in the last few years has there 
been growing concern for the monitoring of actual performance and 
enforcement of compliance with regulations and the conditions of 
permits... The government has a number of reasons for promoting 
environmental responsibility within the firm as the institutional basis for 
an element of self-regulation in its system of management for 
environmental quality. In the first place, the high demands made on the 
firm under the present policy regime in connection with a responsible 
treatment of the environment cannot be met, in the long run, without a 
well-organized system of environmental management at the level of the 
firm. Furthermore, such a system of focused responsibility for the 
implementation of environmental regulations is expected to have 
important consequences for the nature of the regulatory relations between 
government and the firm... Instead of developing and applying detailed 
rules and procedures for ensuring perfect compliance wih the letter of the 
law, government authorities will be concerned with checking on the 
'quality' of the internal control systems and the main lines of the firm's 
environmental policy... Deregulation in the area of environmental policy 
has not... meant (and will not mean) dismantling of the substantive 
regulations designed to promote improved environmental quality. When 
all is said and done, the bottom line of the deregulation efforts with 
regard to environmental management has been the retention, essentially 
intact, of the overall regulatory objectives while striving to simplify and 
streamline existing regulatory procedures and to develop alternatives to 
the more traditional instruments of regulation." (Hanf 1989:195pp)
Although certainly differing in detail, the general evolution of 
environmental policy towards more emphasis on self-responsibility and 
self-regulation of the policy addressees, on substantive enforcement, on 
streamlining and systematisation, i.e. towards re-regulation appears to be 
quite similar in Western industrialized countries with a well-established 
environmental regulatory framework. Therefore, the conclusions of Hanf 
should be generalizable to a certain degree.
For environmental policy and regulation in agriculture this means 
that the development trends observed fit well in this regulatory picture of 
environmental policy in general, although with some time lag and starting 



























































































only in terms of agricultural interests is partly still to lower the publicly 
aspired level of protection of environmental quality, but even more to 
increase the efficiency (and effectiveness) of public agro-environmental 
regulations, though partially at the price of compensation payments for 
farmers for not destroying the environment. This similar evolutionary 
tendency may be concealed by the fact that environmental regulation of 
many industrial activities is part of a well-established regulatory policy 
arena in at least some countries since the 1980s, whereas environmental 
regulation of agriculture is still a newly evolving policy field without a 
comparable basis of already existing regulatory provisions and 
institutions.
On the level of the general deregulation debate, the resistance of the 
agricultural lobby against any regulation positively coincides with the 
political appeal of deregulation. Nevertheless, as the example of the liquid 
manure order of Northrhine-Westfalia indicates, the agricultural interests 
like other industries oppose both the introduction of new, more rigorous 
regulation and the dismantling of old regulation with which they have 
found comfortable ways of living in practice (Teherani-Kronner 1987). 
In substance, there is little correlation between the general debate on 
deregulation and agro-environmental regulation because in the latter case 
there is hardly anything to be deregulated, when the first basic regulations 
of this field are bargained and installed just now, if at all, and because the 
major economic arguments advanced in favour of deregulating other 
policy areas do not well apply for a thoroughly regulated agricultural 
sector, where the agricultural lobby has little interest in deregulation of 
agricultural markets, which provides it with profitable public subsidies 
just because of this public regulation of the agricultural sector. So, the 
embedding of environmental regulation of agriculture in the deregulation 
debate can only be an ideological one, on the one hand, and one of socio­
politico-cultural analysis, on the other hand. As indicated by the title of 
this paper, my question is not on deregulation but is about how far public 
policy and regulation do still matter for environmental protection in 
agriculture.
13. Conclusions
To come back to this central question, the following conclusions 
summarize the findings of the empirical analysis.
1. Public policy and regulation do matter empirically for environmental 
protection in agriculture though to a varying degree. They already had 
some, although limited, substantial impact in this respect.
2. Public policy and regulation do matter for environmental protection 
in agriculture on the level of historical explanation, too. Without them, 




























































































production would be almost certainly worse.11 By this statement the 
possibility in principle of functional equivalents to public regulation is not 
denied; only their actual evolution during the past decades is more or less 
excluded on the basis of historical-empirical analysis.
3. Judged in view of the typical time scale and pattern of policy 
development, the past process of about 20 years of gradual evolution of 
public and political perception of environmental problems of agriculture, 
of public controversy and political bargaining, and of designing 
corresponding policy programs cannot be considered too long. Thus, it 
could be expected that public policy does now matter in this area, but 
public regulation hardly yet. However, the latter can be expected to 
matter in the future though according to the prevailing national policy 
styles.
4. The picture of the social treatment of a problem field has become a 
more complex one of public and private regulation, of formal political 
and  informal self-regulation, and of explicit regulation and  non- 
regulatory procedures like market mechanisms for several reasons: the 
scientific perception of such processes has developed into a more 
differentiated one with the result of pointing out this always existing 
variety of such socio-political processes; the limitations of a strict 
regulatory approach have become more obvious; the reliability of social 
actors behaving predictably according to certain norms has more and 
more been dissolved; the uncertainty and unpredictability of future 
developments, including the unintentional evolution of new policy spaces 
(Majone 1989), undermines the political significance of assumed causal 
relationships. Therefore, the mere opposing of public versus private 
regulation, and of regulation versus deregulation is besides the point.
5. The (objective) increase of the complexity of environmental and of 
social relational configurations, of ecological hazards to mankind, and of 
available knowledge about these developments makes some kind of 
regulatory arrangements to deal with these problems socially rather 
necessary.
6. The openness and attention towards functional equivalents to 
traditional modes of public regulation indicates a growing managerial 
flexibility and a loss of ideological fixation. The question of regulation is 
increasingly perceived as one of pragmatic optimisation where 
functionally equivalent options are weighed one against another with 
respect to their various social, economic, political and cultural 
implications.
7. Private self-regulation is increasingly advocated as a favourable 
option, as long as it internalises public objectives, because it tends to have 
better access to information, better management capabilities, and more 1
11 This statement does not refer to the well known negative environmental impacts of 




























































































direct feed-back loops of benefits and losses of the chosen regulatory 
procedure to the social actors and regulators involved.
8. The cross-national and also cross-sectional variations of agro- 
environmental regulations together with the considerable cross-national 
similarities in the basic substantive problem solutions preferred to 
increase environmental concern in agriculture indicate the flexibility of 
social arrangements on a concrete level to arrive at basically similar 
social modes and possibly substantive results of environmental protection 
in agriculture.
9. The analytical picture of public agro-environmental policy and 
regulation marks a relatively complex pattern of concrete regulatory 
features which rarely fit to just one pole of the analytical distinctions 
made: one finds public, private and mixed regulatory activities, regulation 
and non-regulation, rule-making and rule-enforcement, etc. Thus, the 
countries analysed hardly provide proto-type examples of agro- 
environmental regulation.
10. The main reasons for the varying processes of evolving 
environmental regulation in agriculture can be attributed to differing 
national political cultures (policy styles and policy profiles, see Feick/Jann 
1989), opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1985) and administrative 
resources and authority. The interest consideration pattern and the power 
distribution pattern differ for the political actors involved and concerned 
for the cases of nitrate pollution and nature conservation; these 
differences partly explain the observed variations in the public regulation 
schemes identified.
11. Public policy mattered in the past for environmental protection in 
agriculture, unlike public regulation. Both will matter in the coming 
years. Theoretically, the necessity of public policy and regulation in this 
field can be defended as very likely development paths on empirical 
grounds, but not derived as unequivocally imperative. Sociologically, they 
provide a public medium for debate and serve other objectives than the 
official-formal one of environmental protection in agriculture, too, 
especially as a forum for the political fight of social actors and institutions 
to improve their respective power and bargaining position.
12. The traditional categories of policy analysis concerning politico- 
economic interest relations, institutional arrangements, or policy game 
and policy cycle are still well applicable to analyse political processes 
around agro-environmental regulation. Public policy and regulation still 
provide relevant social channels and media for societal definition, 
decision and development processes though clearly not the only ones, or 
in any case the most important ones.
13. The well established public regulation of agricultural markets, farm 
incomes, and economic agro-structure does in no way guarantee an 
appropriate public regulation of agro-environmental questions. On the 
contrary, these dominant patterns of regulation mostly worked to the 




























































































14. The evolution of environmental protection in agriculture supports the 
hypothesis that the implementation of environmental policy programs is 
dependent on program alteration and structure formation via problem 
pressure, persuasion and social learning, and can no longer simply rely on 
known ways of formal and informal administrative enforcement 
(Knoepfel 1989).
14. Crucial issues: which empirical statements remain feasible?
When keeping in mind that the relevance of public regulation for 
environmental protection in agriculture empirically differs from country 
to country and from case to case, that not an either-or position towards 
functionally equivalent options for protecting the environment against 
agricultural pollution but a mixture of various coordinated modes appears 
preferable in this field, and that contextual variables largely determine the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of different social procedures to 
cope with environmental problems of agriculture, then one easily arrives 
at the final question of this paper: which interesting empirical statements 
remain feasible.
Certainly, some empirically valid statements can be made concerning 
influential reasons for the country- and case-specific development path of 
more public or more private regulation or non-regulation. But when 
these statements tend to lose any chance for generalizability the only 
perspective left for sociological analysis remains more or less one of 
historical interpretation and the generation of meaning (see cf. Bude 
1988). For social scientists, however, the claim usually is a more far- 
reaching one: their empirical analysis should provide insights of more 
general, and not only case-specific (singular) interest.
I have tried to arrive at corresponding conclusions in that direction in 
the previous section. Nevertheless, it has to be conceded, that these 
conclusions remain on a quite abstract and tentative level, let alone 
possible scientific controversy about their theoretical stringency and 
methodological validity. It appears doubtful, however, if much more 
empirically concrete and still rather generalizable statements are really 
feasible. So, the analysis of the empirical reality of public policy and 
regulation for environmental protection in agriculture provides us with 
the main insight of several though not arbitrary ways and possible futures 
of agro-environmental regulation both on the empirical and on the 
theoretical level. There are not only substantially better or worse socio­
political arrangements of dealing with environmental problems of 
agriculture which all have some probability of becoming reality, but there 
are also functionally more or less equivalent social arrangements and 
procedures to reasonably achieve the substantive goals of environmental 
protection in agriculture though with mostly differing implications for 




























































































and political life. What kind of policy oriented conclusions the reader 
draws from these insights has to be left to his/her own judgement.
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